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This paper investigates repeated games with perfect monitoring, where the number of 
repetition is finite, and the discount factor is far less than unity. Players can make a side 
payment contract, but their liability is severely limited. The history of play may not 
necessarily be verifiable. With positive interest rate of the contractible asset, we show 
that, in spite of limited liability and verifiability, efficiency is sustainable in that there 
exist a contract and an efficient perfect equilibrium in its associated game, and that 
efficiency is even uniquely sustainable if there exists the unique one-shot Nash 
equilibrium. In partnership games, efficiency is uniquely and approximately sustainable, 
even if the interest rate equals zero. In partnership games with two players and positive 
interest rate, efficient sustainability is robust to renegotiation-proofness on the terms of 
explicit contracting as well as implicit agreements. 
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper investigates repeated games with perfect monitoring, where the number of 
repetition is finite but sufficiently large, and the discount factor may be far less than unity. 
At the beginning of the initial period, players can make a budget-balancing side payment 
contract. The contract requires each player to invest in a safe asset, and may require a 
deviant to give the whole return from this asset to the others. In the initial period, however, 
players’ limited liability is so severe that each player can invest only a small monetary 
amount. Moreover, the realized history of play may not necessarily be verifiable to the 
court, and therefore, the contract may not necessarily be enforceable. 
We show that, in spite of the limited liability and verifiability above, when the interest 
rate of the asset is positive, efficiency is sustainable in the sense that there exists a 
contract and an efficient perfect equilibrium in its associated game. Benoit and Krishna 
(1985) and Friedman (1985) showed that in standard models of finitely repeated game 
with no side payments, there might exist an approximately efficient perfect equilibrium 
when there exists multiple one-shot Nash equilibria. Radner (1980), Chu and 
Geanakoplos (1988), and Conlon (1996) showed that when players are irrational, there 
might exist an approximately efficient perfect equilibrium, even if there exists the unique 
one-shot Nash equilibrium.
1 In contrast to these works, our result is on ‘exact’ efficiency 
as opposed to ‘approximate’, and does not assume no discounting. In fact, our efficiency 
result holds under the same condition on the discount factor as that under which 
efficiency is sustainable in infinitely repeated games by using trigger strategies. 
It is well known that if there exists the unique one-shot Nash equilibrium, then the 
repetition of the one-shot Nash equilibrium play is the unique perfect equilibrium in 
finitely repeated games. In sharp contrast to this, we show that if there exists the unique 
one-shot Nash equilibrium and the interest rate is positive, then efficiency is even 
uniquely sustainable in the sense that there exists a contract, in the game associated with 
which, there exists the unique perfect equilibrium, and it induces an efficient payoff 
vector. We also show that, in partnership games, even if the interest rate equals zero, 
efficiency is uniquely and approximately sustainable in the sense that there exists a 
contract, in the game associated with which, there exists a perfect equilibrium, and it 
induces an approximately efficient payoff vector. 
                                                 
1 There exists a huge volume of works on repeated games presenting theoretical foundations to the 
widely accepted view that long-term relationships facilitate collusion more than do in short-term 
relationships. For the survey on repeated games, see Pearce (1992).   3 
The logic behind collusive behavior in this paper is different from that in standard 
models. In standard models, players are confronted with the same subgame in every 
period, and this subgame has multiple perfect equilibria. If a player deviates, her 
opponents will retaliate from the next period by playing an unfavorable equilibrium to her. 
Because of this move to the unfavorable equilibrium, each player hesitates to deviate. In 
contrast to this orthodoxy, the present paper adopts an alternative basis for collusion to 
occur. Subgames of a finitely repeated game with side payments differ across past 
histories because the history-contingent contract influences the payoff structures of these 
subgames. These subgames each have their own respective perfect equilibria. If a player 
deviates, all players will be confronted in the next period with the subgame whose perfect 
equilibrium is unfavorable to the deviant. Because of this move to the unfavorable 
subgame, each player hesitates to deviate. Since collusive behavior can be described as a 
unique perfect equilibrium, the predictive power in this paper is much stronger than that 
in standard models. The fact that not only the whole game but also every subgame 
satisfies the uniqueness implies that, in every period, players have no room to renegotiate 
the terms of implicit agreement and improve their welfare. This point contrasts with the 
fact that renegotiation-proofness on the terms of implicit agreement has long been a 
controversial issue in the repeated game literature.
2 
There exists a sizeable literature dealing with the agency problem with moral hazard, 
seeking to clarify whether a single-period relationship attains the first-best allocation 
through the writing of explicit contracts.
3   This literature commonly makes the 
assumption that it is difficult for the court to verify players’ action choices, but that there 
exists a public signal that is randomly determined according to a probability distribution 
conditional on player’s action choices, and this signal is verifiable. Hence, players can 
agree to write an explicit contract that depends not on their action choices but on the 
realization of this signal. A large proportion of this literature was devoted to investigating 
the single-agent problem, while several works such as Holmstrom (1982), Williams and 
Radner (1989), and Legros and Matsushima (1991) investigated multi-agent relationships. 
Legros and Matsushima showed a necessary and sufficient condition under which there 
exists a budget-balancing side payment contract that induces players to choose a 
                                                 
2 See, for example, Bernheim and Rey (1989), Farrell and Maskin (1989) and Pearce (1987) on 
infinitely repeated games, and Benoit and Krishna (1988) on finitely repeated games. 
3 For the references, see the surveys by Hart and Holmstrom (1987), Dutta and Radner (1994), and 
Salanie (1997).   4 
collusive action profile as a Nash equilibrium.
4 This contract, however, requires that 
players pay a large fine as the penalty for deviation. In contrast, the present paper assumes 
that players establish a long-term relationship, but that only small fines, which may be 
close to zero, exist in totality. The paper shows that the establishment of a long-term 
relationship dramatically economizes on monetary fines without harming players’ 
incentive to collude. 
As such, this paper may offer an important economic implication within the field of 
law and economics. In real situations of labor contracting with moral hazard, it is 
practically difficult to establish measures of performance that are always verifiable to the 
court. It is also unrealistic to expect that a limitedly liable worker will be able to pay a 
large fine when the fact that she has neglected her duty could be disclosed to the public. 
From this, it is widely believed that in real situations the legal enforcement of explicit 
contracts plays only a limited role in resolving issues of moral hazard. Many economists, 
such as MacLeod and Malcomson (1989), have emphasized that the self-enforcement of 
implicit contracts instead plays a more crucial role than legal enforcement, which are 
thought of formally as a perfect equilibrium in an infinitely repeated game. In contrast, 
the present paper shows that even if workers’ liability is severely limited and their 
performances are hardly verifiable, the role of legal enforcement is still very crucial and 
even indispensable for workers’ incentives. 
This paper is also in contrast with the literature of the reputational theory of finitely 
repeated games, which assumes incomplete information on players’ types.
5 Several works 
such as Kreps and Wilson (1982) and Milgrom and Roberts (1982) provided their 
respective examples of a chain-store game in which there exists a unique perfect 
Bayesian equilibrium and it induces an approximately efficient allocation. However, 
these results depend crucially on their own specifications of the incomplete information 
structure, while it is hard to tell about how players can determine the well-behaved 
incomplete information structure in advance of their repeated play. The present paper, 
however, assumes complete information and is based on a more plausible scenario of a 
contracting process, in which players will collectively agree to write a side payment 
contract that guarantees both uniqueness and, exact or approximate, efficiency.
6 
                                                 
4 These works did not consider the uniqueness of equilibrium. Ma (1988), and Ma, Moore and 
Turnbull (1988) investigated unique implementation in multi-agent relationships. 
5 For the survey of this literature, see Fudenberg (1992). 
6 For example, one of the partners, called the principal, decides a side payment contract, which 
maximizes her own payoff given the constraint that there exists a unique perfect equilibrium and   5 
Finally, we investigate partnership games with two players, where we assume that the 
interest rate is positive. We show that there may exist a combination of a contract and an 
efficient perfect equilibrium in its associated game that is renegotiation-proof in the sense 
that in any period, the induced payoff vector in the subgame is always efficient 
irrespective of the past history, and therefore, players never agree to breach and 
renegotiate the contract. Hence, we may not need to assume that the contract has full 
commitment power in the sense that players cannot breach and renegotiate it once the 
repeated game starts, and therefore, our efficiency results may be robust to renegotiation 
on the terms of explicit contracting as well as the terms of implicit agreement. Rey and 
Salanie (1990), and Fudenberg, Holmstrom, and Milgrom (1990) showed that in a 
long-term principal-agent relationship, renegotiable short-term contracts would 
implement efficiency. In contrast to the present paper, however, these works depend 
crucially on the assumption that large side payments are possible. 
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 defines the model. Section 3 
shows that efficiency is sustainable, or uniquely sustainable, when the interest rate is 
positive. Section 4 shows sufficient conditions under which efficiency is approximately 
sustainable, or uniquely and approximately sustainable, even if the interest rate equals 
zero. Section 5 defines partnership games with zero interest rates, and shows that 
efficiency is uniquely and approximately sustainable. Section 6 shows that in partnership 
games with two players and zero interest rates, there exists a renegotiation-proof 
combination of a contract and an efficient perfect equilibrium. Finally, Section 7 
concludes. 
                                                                                                                                               
that this perfect equilibrium induces a payoff vector that is no worse than the payoff vector that 
partners can receive outside if they fail to establish their partnership. Another scenario is that all 
players agree to a side payment contract according to the Nash bargaining solution at the 
beginning of period 1 given the constraint that there exists a unique perfect equilibrium and that 
the payoff vector that partners can receive outside is regarded as the threat point.   6 
2. The Model 
 
Let   denote the finite set of players. The component game is given by 
, where   is the set of actions for player  ,  , and   
is the instantaneous payoff function for player i . We assume that there exists a Nash 
equilibrium action profile a  in  . Let a   denote a payoff vector that 
Pareto-dominates a  and efficient in that u , and there exists no a  such 
that u  and  . 
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A finitely repeated game with side payments is given by Γ . Players 
times repeatedly play the component game G , where T  is a positive integer. Let 
 denote the common discount factor. We assume that monitoring is perfect in 
that at the end of every period t , players can observe all players’ action choices 
. We assume that public randomization devices are possible in 
that at the end of every period  , every player observes a public signal   that is drawn 
according to the uniform distribution function on the interval [.
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7 A history up to 
period    is denoted by h . Let h  denote  the 
null history. A history up to the final period T  is called a complete history. The set of 
histories up to period   is denoted by  .  
),..., 1 ( 1 ( ( ) ( a a t ≡
Ht ()
),λ
Fix a positive real number M  and a nonnegative real number r  arbitrarily, 
where we assume that   is less than or equals the discount rate associated with δ , i.e., 








At the beginning of the initial period 1, players agree to write a side payment contract 
denoted by ( , where mm ,  , and τ . ) ,τ m
m
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We assume that each player’s liability is limited in ways that for every i , and every 
, 
N ∈
) ( ) ( T H T h ∈
  m .  M r T h
T h
i
1 )) ( ( ) 1 ( )) ( (
− + − ≥
τ
 
7 We use public randomization devices only in the study of unique sustainability or unique and 
approximate sustainability. 
8 We assume from Section 3 to Section 5 that a side payment contract has full commitment power 
in the sense that in every period players cannot breach and renegotiate it. In Section 6, we will 
drop this assumption and take the possibility of renegotiation on the terms of explicit contracting 
into account.   7 
and for every h , if a  for all  , 
then 
) ( )) ( ),..., 1 ( ( ) ( T H T a a T ∈ ′ ′ = ′ ) ( ) ( t a t ′ = ))} ( ( ,..., 1 { T h t τ ∈
)) ( ( )) ( ( T h m T h m i i = ′  and τ= .  )) ( ( )) ( ( T h T h τ ′
Given the complete history  , players will make transfer payments at the end 
of period τ  and each player i  receives the monetary amount   at this 
time. Hence, the long-run payoff for player   when h  occurs is given by 
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Let  . The upper bound of fines, up to which each 
player is able to pay when the transfer payments are made in period  , is given by 
vhT v hT v hT n (() ) ((() ) , . . . , (() ) ) ≡ 1
t
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An interpretation is put as follows. At the beginning of every period t , 
each player is required to invest ( dollars in a safe asset, which provides her 
with a return of (  dollars at the end of this period with certain. After period 
, i.e., after the transfers are made, no player is required to invest in any such 
assets. Another interpretation is put as follows. Fix a positive real number ε  
arbitrarily. At the beginning of every period t , she can invest 
))} ( ( ,..., 1 { T h τ ∈
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 dollars in the asset. The realized history up to period τ , however, is 
not necessarily verifiable to the court, i.e., can be verified only with probability ε .
)) (T h (
10 
Hence, the expected value of the fine that each player will pay at the end of period 
 is at most ( .  M r
h ( ) 1+
τ T 1 )) ( −
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, the present value of the return at the end of the final period is 
, which diverges to infinity as T  increases, and therefore, implies that 
players’ liability is practically unlimited even in the initial period when the number of 
repetition is sufficiently large. 
M
T 1 δ
A strategy for player   in   is defined by  . Let   denote the set of 
strategies for player i . Let S  and  . The 
expected long-run payoff for player   induced by a strategy profile   is 
denoted by 
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9 Here, we assume that utilities are quasi-linear. 
10  Here, for simplicity, we assume that the probability of the history up to period t  being 
verifiable does not depend on t. This assumption, however, is redundant.   8 
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where   implies the expectation conditional on the play of the strategy profile s. 
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3. Efficiency 
 
We specify a side payment contract, denoted by ( , as follows. We need no 
public randomization devices. For every h , let   be the period in 
which there exist the first deviants from the efficient action profile   when h  occurs, 
i.e., 
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Hence, each player will be fined if and only if she is the first deviant from  . Note that 
 satisfies the assumptions in Section 2. 
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Proof: Fix  ,  , and h  arbitrarily. If   for some 
, then, according to  , player   always continues choosing   after h . Since 
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Q.E.D. 
 
The inequalities (2) imply that in the one-shot game with side payments, each player’s 
one-shot gain from deviation is less than or equals the monetary amount   that 
the contract requires her to pay. This corresponds to the incentive constraints required in 
the final period T  of the repeated game  . The inequalities (3) imply that 
M r
T 1 ) 1 (
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   11 
given that all players play according to the trigger strategy profile   from period 2, each 
player’s one-shot gain from deviation in period 1 is less than or equals the future loss 
from the collapse of their implicit collusion plus the monetary amount M  that  the 
contract requires her to pay at the end of period 1. This corresponds to the incentive 
constraints required in period 1. Theorem 1 implies that the incentive constraints in the 
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Whenever the interest rate r   is positive, then efficiency is sustainable even if the 
discount factor   is far less than unity and each player’s liability in the initial period is 
severely limited, i.e.,   is close to zero. 
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Suppose that   is not only a Nash equilibrium payoff vector but also the minimax 
payoff vector satisfying that u  for  all  . Then, the 
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. Hence, we can conclude that efficiency is sustainable in finitely repeated games 
with small side payments under the same condition as that in infinitely repeated games 
with no side payments. 
The following corollary is also straightforward from Theorem 1. 
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Corollary 3 implies that whenever   is more than or equals the one-shot gain from 
deviation from a , then efficiency is sustainable irrespective of the length of repetition 
 even if all players are myopic and the interest rate is zero, i.e., ( . Hence, 
we can conclude that the establishment of a long-term relationship, together with the use 
of the side payment contract that fines only the first deviants, dramatically economizes on 
monetary fines without harming players’ incentive to collude. 
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Proof: Let   be a perfect equilibrium in Γ . Since a  is the unique Nash 
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If no agent has been fined in the past and   agents deviate in the present, then they will 




. Note that (  satisfies the assumptions in Section 2. 
We specify a ‘modified’ trigger strategy profile s   as follows. For every 
, and every  
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+ +  if 
n





>  for all  ,  t < τ
and 
e
i i a t h s = −
+ + )) 1 ( ( 
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≤  for some  .  t < τ
Note that  , i.e., the strategy profile   induces the efficient payoff vector  ) ( ) (
* a u s v =
+ + + + s
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t
( − ′ t h
(
∈
The following theorem shows a sufficient condition under which s  is the unique 
perfect equilibrium in  . 
+ +
) , , , ( δ τ
+ + + + Γ m T
 
Theorem 5: If a  is the unique Nash equilibrium in  , and for every  , 
e G N i∈
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then, the strategy profile   is the unique perfect equilibrium in   
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Proof: Let   be a perfect equilibrium in  . Since   is the unique Nash 
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From the inequality (8), it follows that for every  , if  ) 1 ( ) 1 ( − ∈ − T H T h
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* a
   . 
* )) 1 ( ( a T h s = −
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)} / ( ) ( { max
*
i i i A a a a u a u n − −
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The inequalities (8) and (9) imply   and  , respectively. Note  0 ) ( > T Bi 0 ) 1 ( > i B
) ( ) 1 ( t B t B i i − + )} ( ) ( ) 1 {(
* 1 1 e
i i T
t t t T a u a u
rM
r + − + =
− − −
δ
δ δ . 
Since the inequality (1) implies that (  is non-increasing with respect to t, it 
follows that for every  , 
1 1 ) 1
− − +
t t r δ
} 2 ,...., 1 { − ∈ T t
    if  ,  ) ) ( ) 1 ( t B t B i i < + 1 ( ) 2 ( + < + t B t B i i
which implies that if   and  , then   for all  . Hence,  0 ) ( > T Bi 0 ) 1 ( > i B 0 ) ( > t Bi } ,...., 1 { T t∈
0 ) ( > t Bi  for all i  and all  ,  N ∈ } ,...., 1 { T t∈
and therefore, 
0 )) 1 ( , ( )) 1 ( , / ( > − − −
+ + t h s v t h s s v i i i . 




The inequalities (8) imply that in the one-shot game with side payments, each player’s 
one-shot gain from deviation is less than or equals the monetary amount   that 
the contract requires a deviant to pay, irrespective of which actions the other agents will 
choose in this game. This corresponds to the incentive constraints in terms of dominance 
required in the final period T . The inequalities (9) imply that given that all players play 
according to the trigger strategy profile s  from period 2, each player’s one-shot gain 
from deviation in period 1 is less than or equals the future loss from the collapse of their 
implicit collusion plus the monetary amount   that the contract requires her to pay at 
the end of period 1, irrespective of which actions the other agents will choose in period 1. 
This corresponds to the incentive constraints in terms of dominance required in period 1. 
Hence, Theorem 5 implies that the incentive constraints in terms of dominance in the 
initial and finial periods are sufficient for the unique perfect equilibrium property in all 
periods. 
M r




Efficiency is said to be uniquely sustainable with respect to (  if for every 
sufficiently large T , there exist (  and   such  that    is the unique perfect 
equilibrium in Γ  and  induces  . The following corollary is 
straightforward from Theorem 5. 
) , , r M δ
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Corollary 6: Efficiency is uniquely sustainable with respect to   if  , and for 
every  i , 
) , , ( r M δ 0 > r
N ∈
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Hence, efficiency is uniquely sustainable with respect to (  irrespective of 
 if  , and for every i , 
) , , r M δ
0 > M 0 > r N ∈
)} ( ) / ( { max )} ( ) ( {
1
* * a u a a u n a u a u i i i A a
e
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4. Approximate Efficiency 
 
This section assumes that the interest rate of the asset is zero, i.e., r , and that 
players’ liability in the initial period, M , is so small that the inequities (6) do not 
necessarily hold. Efficiency is said to be approximately sustainable with respect to 
 if for every  , and every sufficiently large T , there exists   and a 
perfect equilibrium   in   such that 
0 =
(m ) , , ( r M δ 0 > ε
( Γ
0 > ) ,τ
s ) , , , δ τ m T
ε ≤ − ) ( ) (
* a u s v i i  for all i .  N ∈
 
Theorem 7: Suppose that r , and there exists an infinite sequence of action profiles 
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Then, efficiency is approximately sustainable with respect to ( .  ) 0 , ,M δ
 
Proof: We specify a side payment contract (  as follows. We do not use public 
randomization devices. For every h , let τ  be the period in which 
there exist the first deviants from (  when h  occurs, i.e., 
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* T h t τ <
When there exist no deviants, i.e.,a  for all  , let  . 
Let    denote the number of the first deviants, i.e., the number of players i 
choosing  . For every  , and every  , let 
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τ τ
Note that   satisfies the assumptions in Section 2. We specify a strategy profile 
 as follows. For every  , and every  , 
) , (
* * τ m
S s ∈
* t ∈{,. . ., } 1 T ) 1 ( ) 1 ( − ∈ − t H t h
) 1 ( * )) 1 ( (
+ − = −
t T a t h s  if   for all  , 
) 1 ( ) (
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τ τ
T a a τ < t
and   18 
e a t h s = − )) 1 ( (
*  if   for some  . 
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τ τ
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Fix  ,  , and h  arbitrarily.  If   for 
some  , then, according to  , player i always continues choosing   after  . 
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Suppose that a  for all  . Fix a  arbitrarily. Let   be 
the strategy satisfying that 
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Note from the inequalities (11) that if t , then  T <
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Note that (  is the sequence of action profiles that players choose on the 
equilibrium path. Here, M  can be so small that the instantaneous payoff vector in the 
final period T ,  , is very close to the one-shot Nash equilibrium payoff vector 
. However, the switch of action choices from a  to   in period   (slightly) 
strengthens players’ incentive to play more collusively in period  , and therefore, the 
instantaneous payoff vector in period T ,  , could be better than u . By 
recursively using the same arguments, it follows that in the periods that are far from the 
final period, players have incentive to play (almost) fully collusive behavior. 
) ,...,
) 1 ( ) ( a a
T
) (
) 1 ( a u
) (
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) 2 ( a u )
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Efficiency is said to be uniquely and approximately sustainable with respect to 
 if for every  , and every sufficiently large T , there exist (  and a 
strategy profile s such that   is the unique perfect equilibrium in Γ  and it 
satisfies 
) , , ( r M δ 0 > ε 0 > ) ,τ m
) , , δ τ s , ( m T
ε ≤ ) − ( ) (
* a s vi ui  for all  .  N i∈  19 
 
Theorem 8: Suppose that r,    is the unique Nash equilibrium in G , and there 
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and the equality (12) holds. Then, efficiency is uniquely and approximately sustainable 
with respect to  .  ) 0 , , ( M δ
 
Proof: We specify a side payment contract (   as follows. We use public 
randomization devices. Let n   denote the number of players i  satisfying 
. For every h , let   be the first period t in which there 
exist deviants from (  and the realized public signal   is less than the 
number of the deviants divided by  , i.e., 
) ,
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Note that (  satisfies the assumptions in Section 2. We specify a strategy profile 
 as follows. For every  , and every  , 
) ,
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* * } ,..., 1 { T t∈ ) 1 ( ) 1 ( − ∈ − t H t h
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* * τ τ
τ λ ≤  for some  .  t < τ
Let a strategy profile s be a perfect equilibrium in Γ . Since a  is the 
unique Nash equilibrium in G , it follows that for every i , every t , and 
) , , , (
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e
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From the inequality (13), it follows that for every h , if  ) 1 ( ) 1 ( − ∈ − T H T
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In the next section, we investigate specified partnership games where there exists a 
sequence (  that satisfies the conditions in Theorem 7 or Theorem 8.  ,...) ,
) 2 ( ) 1 ( a a  21 
5. Partnerships 
 
This section investigates partnership games defined as follows. For every  , let 
, and 
N i∈
] 1 , 0 [ = i A
  u  for  all a   i
i j
j i a a a − = ∑
≠
α ) ( A ∈
where we assume 
  ( .  0 1 ) 1 > − − α n
Note that there exists the unique one-shot Nash equilibrium  , and   
is the minimax payoff vector. Let the efficient action profile be given by  , 
where   Pareto-dominates  , i.e., 
) 0 ,..., 0 ( =
e a ) (
e a u




) ( 0 1 ) 1 ( ) (
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i i a u n a u = > − − = α  for  all i .  N ∈
From Corollary 2, it follows that efficiency is sustainable with respect to   
if  , and 













Since    is the minimax payoff vector, it follows that the inequality (15) 
is a necessary condition for the existence of a side payment contract   and a 
perfect equilibrium payoff vector other than   in  . Moreover, from 
the inequality (15), it follows that efficiency is sustainable with respect to   
irrespective of   if  , and 
) 0 ,..., 0 ( ) ( =
e a u
M
) , ( τ m
(δ
) (
e a u ) , , , ( δ τ m T Γ











where the inequality (16) is a necessary condition under which there exist   and  a 
perfect equilibrium payoff vector other than   in Γ , irrespective of 
. We must note that the inequality (16) is a necessary condition under which there 
exists a perfect equilibrium payoff vector other than   in the infinitely repeated 
game with no side payments. 
) , ( τ m
) (






Proposition 9:  In the partnership game, there exists an infinite sequence of action 
profile    that satisfies the inequalities (10) and (11) and the equality (12) if 
the inequality (15) holds. 
,...) , (
) 2 ( ) 1 ( a a
 
Proof: We specify    as follows. For every  , let  ,...) , (
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Note that the specified   satisfies the inequalities (10) and (11). Suppose 
that the inequality (12) does not hold. Then, it must hold that 
,...) , (


























i a u M a δ  for  all r . 
Since   is non-decreasing with respect to  , there exists   such that 
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which is a contradiction because of the inequality (15). Hence, we have proved 
.  1 ) 1 ( ) ( lim
) ( − − =
∞ →






The following theorem is straightforward from Theorems 7 and 8, and Proposition 
9. 
 
Theorem 10: Efficiency is approximately sustainable with respect to   if the 
inequality (15) holds. Efficiency is approximately sustainable with respect to   
irrespective of    if the inequality (16) holds. 
) 0 , , ( M δ
(δ ) 0 , ,M
M
 
Hence, it follows from Theorem 10, together with the arguments above, that 
approximate efficient sustainability when   holds under the same condition as 
efficient sustainability when  . From Corollary 6, it follows that efficiency is 








) 1 ( 1 ) 1 (
) 1 (





Note that the right hand side of the inequality (17) converges zero as   increases.  This 
implies that when the gains from the increase of the other players’ effort levels are 
sufficiently large, efficiency is uniquely sustainable, even if the discount factor is close 
to zero. Moreover, from the inequalities (17), it follows that efficiency is uniquely 
sustainable with respect to   irrespective  of   if  , and 
α
) , , ( r M δ M 0 > r
(18)  
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Proposition 11: In the partnership game, there exists an infinite sequence of action 
profile    that satisfies the inequalities (13) and (14) and the equality (12) if 
the inequality (17) holds 
,...) , (
) 2 ( ) 1 ( a a
 
Proof: Choose   arbitrarily, which is sufficiently close to  . From the 
inequality (17), it follows that 
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Note that the specified   satisfies the inequalities (13) and (14). Suppose 
that the inequality (12) does not hold. Then, it must hold that 
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which is a contradiction because of the inequality (19). Hence, we have proved 
.  1 ) 1 ( ) ( lim
) ( − − =
∞ →






The following theorem is straightforward from Theorems 8 and 9, and Proposition 
10.   24 
 
Theorem 12:  Efficiency is uniquely and approximately sustainable with respect to 
 if the inequality (17) holds. Efficiency is uniquely and approximately 
sustainable with respect to   irrespective  of    if the inequality (18) holds. 
) 0 , , ( M δ
) 0 , , ( M δ M
 
Hence, it follows that unique and approximate efficient sustainability when   
holds under the same condition as unique efficient sustainability when  . 
0 = r
0 > r
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6. Renegotiation-Proofness 
 
This section reconsiders the partnership games with two players, i.e.,  . We 
confine our attention to the class of side payment contracts (  satisfying that 
transfers are made only in the final period, i.e., 
2 = n
) ,τ m
    for  all h .  T T h = )) ( ( τ ) ( ) ( T H T ∈
Hence, we will simply write   instead of (  for a side payment contract in the 
class above. 
m ) ,τ m
Fix   arbitrarily. For every t , let   denote the set of 
combinations of a side payment contract and a strategy profile   satisfying that 
for every  , every  , and every  , 
) , , ( r T δ
,..., {t ∈ τ
} ,..., 1 { T ∈





} T ) 1 ( ∈ − τ H h
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    whenever   and a   0 )) ( ( = ′ T h mi ) 1 ( ) 1 ( − = − ′ t h t h )) 1 ( ( ) ( − ′ = ′ τ τ h s
for all  ,  } ,..., { T t ∈ τ
where we denote h . Note that   belongs to 
 if and only if   satisfies the perfect equilibrium property in   after 
period    and no players are fined when all players conform to   after  period t. 
)) ( ), ( ),..., 1 ( ), 1 ( ( ) ( τ λ τ λ τ ′ ′ ′ ′ = ′ a a
s
) , ( s m
, (T Γ ) (t Z ) , , r m δ
t s
We allow players to breach and renegotiate the contract in any period by replacing 
the contract with any contract that belongs to  , if they unanimously want to do so. 
A combination of a side payment contract and a strategy profile   is said to be 
renegotiation-proof if for every  , and every  , there exist 
no   such  that v , and 
) (t Z
, (s v ≠
) , ( s m
1 ( − t H } ,..., 1 { T t∈
) ); 1 ( , m t h ′ −
) ) 1 ( ∈ − t h
) ); 1 m ) ( ) , ( t Z s m ∈ ′ ′ ( ( t h s − ′
) ); 1 ( , ( ) ); 1 ( , ( m t h s v m t h s v − ≥ ′ − ′ . 
Note that    is renegotiation-proof if for every  , and every 
,   belongs to the Pareto frontier of the payoff vector 
set, i.e.,   is either a convex combination of   and (  
or a convex combination of   and  . The following theorem states 
that when the interest rate is positive, efficient sustainability is robust to 
renegotiation-proofness on the terms of explicit contracting as well as implicit 
agreements, even if players’ liability is severely limited in the initial period. 
) , ( s m
) 1 ( − t
( , t h s −
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Theorem 13: In the partnership game with two players, there exists   that is 
renegotiation-proof such that    is a perfect equilibrium in   and 
  if 
) , ( s m
, , ,m δ s ) ( r T Γ
) ( ) ; (
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Proof: We specify a ‘tit-for-tat’ strategy profile    in ways that  S s ∈ ~
  ~ ,  )) 1 , 1 ( ( )) 0 ( (
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and for every  , every  , and every  ,  } ,..., 2 { T t∈ ) 1 ( ) 1 ( − ∈ − t H t h } 2 , 1 { ∈ i  26 
0 )) 1 ( ( ~ = − t h s  if   and  ,  )) 2 ( ( ~ ) 1 ( − ≠ − t h s t a j j )) 2 ( ( ~ ) 1 ( − = − t h s t a i i
and 
1 )) 1 ( ( ~ = − t h si  otherwise, 
where  . Note  . We specify    in ways that for every  , 
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)) 1 ( ( ) ( − ≠ T h s T a j j , 
and 
0 )) ( ( ~ = T h mi  otherwise. 
Hence, each player will be fined if and only if she deviates in the final period. Note that 
 satisfies the assumption in Section 2, and  . For every  , 
and every h , the future payoff vector induced by (  after 
,  , belongs to the Pareto frontier of the payoff vector set, i.e., it 
is either a convex combination of   and   or a convex combination 
of   and ( . This implies that   is  renegotiation-proof. 
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(t h
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   .  0 1 ) 1 ( ) ~ ); 1 ( , / ~ ( ) ~ ); 1 ( , ~ (
1 ≥ − − ≥ − − −
− M m T h s s v m T h s v
T
i i i δ
Note from the inequality (21) that for every i , every  , every 
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Q.E.D. 
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7. Conclusion 
 
This paper investigated finitely repeated games with perfect monitoring, where at 
the beginning of the initial period, players can make a budget-balancing side payment 
contract. We assumed that the discount factor may be far less than unity, but is greater 
than or equals the minimal value, above which, efficiency is sustainable by using trigger 
strategies in standard models of infinitely repeated game. We assumed that players’ 
liability may be severely limited in the initial period, and that the history of play may 
not necessarily be verifiable. We showed that whenever the interest rate of the 
contractible asset is positive then efficiency is sustainable. We showed that even if the 
interest rate is zero, efficiency is approximately sustainable in the partnership game. 
Next, we assumed that the discount factor is greater than the minimal value but still far 
less than unity, and that there exists the unique one-shot Nash equilibrium. On these 
assumptions, we showed that efficiency is even uniquely sustainable when the interest 
rate is positive, and also showed that efficiency is uniquely and approximately 
sustainable in the partnership game, even if the interest rate is zero. Finally, we showed 
that in the partnership game with two players and with positive interest rate, efficient 
sustainability is robust to renegotiation-proofness on the terms of explicit contracting as 
well as implicit agreements. 
There are open questions about renegotiation proofness such as whether 
approximate efficiency is robust to renegotiation-proofness when the interest rate is zero, 
whether we can extend the possibility result shown in Section 6 to the three or more 
player cases, and so on. It would be an important future research to characterize the 
class of renegotiation-proof combinations of a side payment contract and a perfect 
equilibrium in the more general games. 
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